Iran's IRGC mirrors Washington's Fabian strategy, WSJ reader argues

A reader letter published in the Wall Street Journal Opinion section draws a direct parallel between George Washington's attrition-based military doctrine and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps's approach to warfare in Iran, framing the comparison as evidence that the IRGC's strategy of survival and gradual erosion mirrors the Fabian tactics that secured American independence.

The letter, written by William David Stone of Beverly Hills, California, responds to Lindsay Chervinsky's op-ed "How George Washington's Defeat Led to America's Victory," published Aug. 27. Stone writes that Washington's "Fabian strategy of biting the enemy's ankles and just surviving sounds a lot like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps's strategy in Iran today." The letter appeared in the Sept. 8 print edition.

The Fabian strategy — named after the Roman general Quintus Fabius Maximus, who avoided pitched battles against Hannibal's superior forces in the Second Punic War — emphasizes attrition, delaying tactics, and avoiding decisive engagements until the enemy's strength is exhausted. Washington employed this approach during the Revolutionary War, most notably after the disastrous New York campaign of 1776, when he retreated across New Jersey rather than risk the destruction of the Continental Army.

The comparison carries particular weight given the IRGC's demonstrated operational doctrine across the Middle East. Rather than confronting the United States or its regional allies in conventional force-on-force engagements, the IRGC has relied on asymmetric tools: proxy militias in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen; drone and missile programs that have been tested against Saudi oil infrastructure and Israeli targets; and naval harassment in the Persian Gulf. The strategy has allowed Iran to project power and impose costs on adversaries while keeping the Iranian homeland largely insulated from direct retaliation.

The analogy also resonates with the historical record of how Washington's approach ultimately succeeded. The Continental Army's survival through the winter at Valley Forge in 1777-78, combined with French entry into the war following the Saratoga victory, gradually shifted the strategic balance. The parallel suggests that Iran's leadership may be calculating that time is on its side — that the United States and its allies will eventually exhaust their political will for sustained confrontation in the region.

For markets, the strategic parallel matters less for what it says about Washington's tactics and more for what it implies about the durability of Iran's regional posture. If the IRGC is indeed pursuing a long-horizon strategy of attrition rather than seeking decisive confrontation, the risk calculus for energy markets, Gulf sovereign wealth flows, and regional defense spending shifts accordingly. The last major direct U.S.-Iran military exchange — the January 2020 strike that killed Qassem Soleimani and Iran's subsequent ballistic missile attack on Al Asad Air Base — demonstrated both sides' preference for calibrated escalation over open conflict.

The letter adds to a growing body of commentary examining whether Iran's military doctrine, shaped by decades of sanctions and the experience of the Iran-Iraq War, has evolved into a deliberate strategy of strategic patience. Whether that patience ultimately pays off for Tehran the way it did for Washington remains an open question — but the historical framing offers a useful lens for understanding the IRGC's calculations.

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.